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Popular consent and foreign policy choices: war
against the Philippines and covert action in Chile
JAECHUN KIM AND DAVID HUNDT*
It is usually assumed that US policy makers need to generate popular
consent in order to undertake regime change against another state. This
article explores the ways in which contextual factors such as the joint
democracy effect, popular values and public moods influenced efforts by
elites in the United States to generate popular consent for regime change in
the Philippines and Chile. Against the backdrop of the Vietnam War, the
United States undertook covert action in Chile due to public recognition
of the target state’s democratic credentials and a public mood opposed
to further military ventures. In contrast, the absence of a strong joint
democracy effect, a national mood infused with romantic nationalism qua
militarism and social Darwinism facilitated efforts by US elites to generate
consent for the invasion and occupation of the Philippines. Subsequently,
this article contributes to understandings of the domestic-level factors that
influence foreign policy decisions.
Keywords: democratic peace; popular consent; regime change; US foreign
policy
Introduction
It is tempting to conclude that governments can ignore factors such as public
opinion in the making of foreign policy, but the costs of doing so may be
significant. Unpopular wars*especially those that result in high levels of
casualties*may sap national morale and support for an incumbent government
(Mueller 2005). Consequently, Reiter and Stam (2002) argue, governing elites
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in democracies have the ‘unique task’ of generating popular consent for critical
foreign policy decisions.1 Public opinion is one of the contextual factors that
affects the making of foreign policy, and this article explores how the joint
democracy effect*the reduced possibility of war between states as they become
more democratic*and distinct national moods complicated consent-generating
efforts of US elites in two different cases: the Philippines phase of the Spanish
American war in the late nineteenth century and the covert action against
Salvador Allende’s Chile in the early 1970s. These incidences of the United
States using force overseas help illuminate a crucial but underexplored
mechanism of foreign policy-making: the role of domestic factors such as
public opinion in the shaping of elite preferences.
If the logic of the ‘democratic peace’ is accepted at face value, the degree to
which two states are recognised as democracies is a useful predictor of the
probability that they will come into conflict. Drawing on the democratic peace
literature, we argue that the joint democracy effect varies in accordance with
popular perceptions of a target state. The more the public perceives another
state to be a democracy, the more public opinion constrains the use of force.
It is impossible to entirely rule out the use of force between democracies, but
the potential for conflict among such dyads will be lower if both states are
democratic. When coupled with an introverted public mood, the joint
democracy effect is even stronger. If the public opposes the use of force abroad,
the political costs of using force may be so high as to make the venture
unfeasible. In contrast, an extroverted public mood may lend support to elites
intent on enacting ‘regime change’, or efforts by one state to unseat a foreign
government, even against a fellow democracy*that is, a mood of national
confidence may contribute to a more militarist foreign policy.
As noted, the joint democracy effect does not provide an iron-clad guarantee
that conflict will not occur between democracies, and, indeed, empirical
evidence suggests that a ‘strong’ reading of the democratic peace may only
apply to the oldest and most established democracies (predominantly those in
the Western world). Rather than using joint democracy to predict the likelihood
of interstate conflict (see, for instance, Goldsmith et al. 2008), we use it to
explore how US elites respond to public opinion when a potential target has
democratic credentials that fall short of those in Western states. In doing so, we
seek to generate, rather than test, hypotheses (King et al. 1994: 1467) about
the conditions in which US elites pursue regime change. We seek to build on,
and contribute to, research into the mechanisms of the democratic peace (Hayes
2009) by highlighting the role of the joint democracy effect in a US context:
rather than obviating the use of force against a democracy, it may merely
encourage US elites to undertake covert action rather than open war.
The next section of the article outlines our understanding of the role of public
opinion in the making of foreign policy and its potential to act as either a
resource or impediment to policy makers. We also explain our choice of the
Philippines and Chile as case studies. The following sections illustrate how public
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opinion complicated the policy-making process: the democratic credentials of
the targets constrained policy options, but joint democracy was insufficient to
dissuade elites from pursuing regime change. The final section summarises the
main findings of the article.
Public opinion and the democratic peace
In keeping with the democratic peace thesis, Owen (1997) claims that the public
may oppose war against a fellow democracy. From a rational-choice perspective,
the public tends to prefer conflicts with other democracies to be peacefully
resolved via international negotiation, because it is the public that bears the
burden of war. In addition, democracies ‘try to follow the same norms of conflict
resolution as have been developed within and characterize their domestic
political processes’ (Russett 1993: 35), although the preferences of elites may
vary considerably from those of the public. Both normative concerns and
rational self-interest thus influence the consent-generating process by reducing
the possibility of war between democracies (Reuveny and Li 2003: 3256).
Public attitudes towards decisions about war and peace are also a function of
popular values and the public mood. For Holmes (1985: 2), the public mood
explains generation-long societal swings: it has proven to be ‘a dominant force
in American foreign policy and limits governmental actions’. Klingberg (1979:
38) divides US history into extrovert and introvert phases. Introvert phases are
characterised by the public’s reluctance to support overseas military campaigns,
but the public is more supportive of military ventures during extrovert phases.
Identification of a state as a democracy undermines elites’ efforts to generate
consent for regime change during introvert phases (Holmes 1985: 25), but elites
can generate consent for war against another democracy if the public mood is
jingoistic. In other words, the public mood and popular values influence the
public’s propensity to support the use of force. By treating public mood as a
contextual variable, we seek to enhance the capacity of the democratic peace
theory to predict policy outcomes. Figure 1 summarises our understanding of
the interaction of the joint democracy effect and public mood, and their impact
on policy outcomes.
Joint Democracy Effect 
Use of Open
Military
Force  
National Mood 
Introverted Extroverted 
Moderate Unclear  Covert Action Open Military Action  
Strong Unfeasible Covert Action (subtle methods) 
Weak Feasible Covert Action and Open Military Action 
Figure 1. Joint Democracy Effect, National Mood and Policy Choices.
Source: Created on the basis of the authors’ assumptions and Sullivan (2004: 5, 7 [Tables 2 and 3]).
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If the public identifies a target state as a democracy (that is, if the joint
democracy effect is strong), elites are highly unlikely to openly declare war on
that state. US elites are instead likely to resort to ‘subtle’ forms of covert action,
such as tampering with elections and undermining governments deemed hostile
to US interests (Sullivan 2004: 46). Regardless of the public mood, US elites
are unlikely to countenance military action against states that fall in this
category.
If the joint democracy effect is weak (or non-existent), the United States may
intervene in an autocratic target state either overtly or covertly. Methods
available include military invasion, coups and assassination. The United States
may also support autocratic allies for ideological and geopolitical reasons. For
instance, US elites tolerated violations of human rights by some of its cold war
allies.
If the joint democracy effect is moderate, the expected outcomes in terms of
policy are less clear. On the one hand, a US public infused with an introverted
mood may oppose the invasion or destabilisation of a state endowed with some
democratic credentials. If elites cannot generate consent for the use of force,
the joint democracy effect may compel them to pursue covert action instead.
On the other hand, the public may consent to military action against a state
with some democratic credentials, especially if elites succeed in portraying the
target as an enemy or a threat to the United States. An extroverted mood is
conducive to such an outcome. Figure 2 illustrates the main potential outcomes
if the joint democracy effect is moderate.
In addition to informing our understanding of the various responses available
to elites, and the constraining power of public opinion, the democratic
peace framework reveals ‘regularity in how security threats are constructed’
(Hayes 2009: 979; our emphasis) by elites. Consequently, the democratic
peace thesis can assist in identifying patterns of US intervention in other states.
Figure 3 categorises cases of intervention in accordance with joint democracy’s
degree of effectiveness. In the United States’ ‘long regime-change century’,
PUBLIC ELITES POLICY
Introverted,
Sceptical
National Mood   
Difficult to
Generate
Consent   
Extroverted,
Confident
National Mood   
Easy to
Generate
Consent   
Open war 
Covert action 
Moderate
Joint Democracy
Effect   
Figure 2. Moderate levels of Joint Democracy and predicted policy outcomes.
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Kinzer (2006: 83) identifies two waves of interventions: one lasting from 1893
to 1911 and another following World War II. A third wave might be said to
begin in the post-cold war period. The cases in Figure 3 have been organised
into these subcategories for ease of analysis.
The joint democracy effect was strong in only two cases: efforts to tamper
with electoral processes in Italy (Sullivan 2004: 237) and the support offered
to the political opposition in the dying months of the Whitlam Labor
government in Australia (Sullivan 2004: 1202). By their very nature, these
actions were difficult to detect and not subject to public scrutiny. The joint
democracy effect was weak in most cases of US intervention. The list of the
‘weak’ cases in Figure 3 is not exhaustive, but their sheer number and frequency
illustrate their favoured status among US elites. As most interventions have
targeted non-democratic states, elites have rarely been compelled to generate
popular consent.2
A relatively small number of cases fall into the category of a moderate degree
of joint democracy, and it is these which we focus on in order to discern
the potential for public opinion to act as a restraining force in the making of
US foreign policy. The Philippine War, which, for some (Ray 1995: 115;
Russett 1993: 21), is a ‘close call’ for the democratic peace, occurred when the
United States’ policy of regime change first gathered momentum. It falls at the
midpoint of the first wave of interventions, and occurred in one of the two
regions of ‘America’s pre-World War II ‘‘manifest destiny’’: the Western
Hemisphere and eastern Asia’ (Kinzer 2006: 2). Chile, meanwhile, represents
the second wave of interventions*modelled on the coups in Iran and
Guatemala in the early 1950s*and is situated in the other of the United
States’ two main spheres of interest and influence. In a classic cold war-era
operation, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) funnelled millions of
dollars to anti-Allende forces and dissuaded US firms from investing in Chile
Joint Democracy Effect Interventions 
Moderate 
First wave: Philippines 1898–1901 
Second wave: Iran 1953, Guatemala 1954, Chile 1973 
Third wave: Venezuela 2002 
Strong Second wave: Post-war Italy, Australia 1975 
Weak
First wave: Hawaii 1893, Nicaragua 1909, Honduras 1911 
World Wars I and II 
Second wave: Cuba 1961, Congo 1960s, Indonesia 1965–6,
Angola 1975, Afghanistan 1980s, Nicaragua 1980s, Libya
1981–6, Grenada 1983, Panama 1989   
Third wave: Iraq 1991–6, Somalia, 1992–4, Haiti 1994,
former Yugoslavia 1990s, Afghanistan 2001–, Iraq 2003–  
Figure 3. US Interventions by era.
Sources: Recreated on basis of Hastedt (2009), Kinzer (2006), Sullivan (2004, 2008), Weiner
(2007).
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(Sullivan 2004: 1135). The cases of the Philippines and Chile thus represent
two varieties of regime change (open war and covert action), two waves of
regime change and two spheres of US interest since the emergence of the United
States as a great power. We base our case selection on the ‘method of
agreement’ rather than the ‘method of difference’ in order to highlight contrasts
and generate insightful hypotheses (Mill 2004: 185209)*that is, we inten-
tionally select cases at two markedly different times not to draw hasty
conclusions about the causal effects of public mood and the joint democracy
effect, but to illustrate how these factors can complicate consent-generating
efforts on the part of US elites.
Towards annexation in the Philippines
The Philippines were virtually unknown in the United States before Admiral
George Dewey destroyed the Spanish fleet at Manila Bay in May 1898. Most
Americans were unsure whether the Philippines were ‘islands or canned goods’
(Miller 1982: 13).
Economic interests were a crucial factor in the decision to annex the
Philippines. In the late nineteenth-century United States, a saturated home
market was insufficient to meet the needs of expanding industrial production
and excess capital. Two recessions at the close of the century convinced some
Americans that the path to prosperity lay in imperial expansion. Consequently,
the archipelago was viewed as a valuable possession in its own right and also
as a stepping stone to the Chinese market. Rather than assenting to Filipino
aspirations of independence after the defeat of Spain, US business interests
favoured annexation (Kinzer 2006: 468). According to one historian,
Americans ‘saw the connection between the Philippines and the potential
market . . . the San Francisco Chamber of Commerce petitioned the president to
keep the islands, ‘‘with a view to strengthening our trade relations with the
Orient’’’ (Campbell 1976: 285). The acquisition of the Philippines as a naval
base would serve the United States’ burgeoning geopolitical interests. Urged on
by naval officers such as Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, President William
McKinley recognised the potential of the Philippines to be a US vanguard in the
Pacific (Kinzer 2006: 33).
Public opinion did not initially favour the annexation of the Philippines.
On 28 June 1898, for instance, the New York Times argued against retaining
the islands. A shift in public opinion appeared to drive the annexation. In early
August, Public Opinion reported that 28 major newspapers favoured the
annexation of the Philippines, 21 were leaning in that direction, and only 16
were opposed (Miller 1982: 16). In September, the Literary Digest published a
poll showing strong public support for retaining the archipelago. On 25
October, McKinley declared that he favoured keeping the islands: annexation
promised the ‘greatest political gain’ and offered the ‘fewest political dangers’
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(Welch 1979: 10). ‘The sole concern of the President’, wrote one observer, ‘was
with the mood and whim of public opinion’ (May 1961: 255). Despite public
opinion favouring the annexation of the Philippines, some Americans opposed
the decision on normative grounds. McKinley’s task was to generate sufficient
popular consent to solidify the United States’ already substantial position in the
archipelago.
The people of the Philippines had claims to independence following the
routing of Spanish forces, and expected that the United States would recognise
the democratic elements of the archipelago’s political development as providing
some grounds for self-government. The sovereignty of the Philippines Republic
was not recognised universally, but as citizens of ‘the first democratic republic
in Asia’, Filipinos possessed ‘the first democratic constitution made by the
Asians’ and evidently understood the basic principles of democracy (Agoncillo
1960; our emphasis). A US authority on constitutional law remarked that the
Malolos Constitution*which established a republic within months of Spain’s
defeat in Manila*‘conform[ed] to many tests of a good written constitution’
and ‘faithfully portray[ed] the aspirations and political ideals of the people’
(cited in Zaide 1939: 537). Hayden (1942: 32) notes: ‘This state was democratic
and liberal and was pledged to a careful regard for the protection and
development of the masses of its citizens’.
Emilio Aguinaldo was a respected figure due to his being chosen by the
Malolos Assembly, some of whose members were elected by popular vote. The
government was universally recognised among the people of the islands
(Wildman 1901: 142). General Arthur MacArthur confirmed this claim, telling
a US reporter: ‘the Filipino masses were loyal to Aguinaldo and the government
he heads’ (cited in Miller 1982: 94). Despite claims that ‘savages’ populated the
archipelago, the republic was a sophisticated society enriched by cultural and
commercial ties with neighbouring states. It had developed ‘obedience to, and
respect for, law and established authority’*revolts were the exception rather
than the rule (Robles 1969: 290). Some US representatives sympathised with
Filipino aspirations for independence. Dewey’s report in June 1898 ended with
generous praise: ‘Filipinos are far superior in their intelligence and more capable
of self-government than the natives of Cuba’ (cited in Snyder 1972: 46).
Aguinaldo, if not his US counterparts, believed that the two states shared the
norms of liberty and self-determination. ‘The great North American Nation’,
Aguinaldo claimed after the defeat of Spain,
the cradle of genuine liberty, and therefore the friend of our people,
oppressed and enslaved by the tyranny and despotism of its rulers, has come
to us manifesting a protection as decisive as it is undoubtedly disinterested
toward our inhabitants (cited in Snyder 1972: 178).
The republic’s first president would be disappointed. According to Aguinaldo:
‘Dewey, Pratt, Wildman and others dealt with me in good faith . . . up to the
58 Jaechun Kim and David Hundt
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [D
ea
kin
 U
niv
ers
ity
 L
ibr
ary
] a
t 1
5:1
0 1
9 J
an
ua
ry
 20
12
 
moment President McKinley finally made up his mind to keep the Philippines’
(Aguinaldo and Pacis 1957: 63).
Despite the aspirations of Aguinaldo’s government to independence and
sound relations with the United States, and the testimonials of US officials
to support such a development, McKinley announced in late 1898 that the
United States would annex not only Cuba and Puerto Rico, but also the
Philippines. Senator George Hoar praised Aguinaldo as a brave and honest
man, praised the political competence of the Philippines and accused McKinley
of hypocrisy. On learning of the proposed annexation, General Thomas
Anderson said: ‘I submit, with all deference, that we have heretofore underrated
the native. They are not ignorant, savage tribes, but have a civilization of their
own’ (cited in Snyder 1972: 656).
The announcement did not pass unnoticed in the Philippines. Aguinaldo
had by now assembled an army with which to defend his republic. When it
became clear that the United States would not accede to Filipino aspirations of
independence, Aguinaldo’s troops launched a war of resistance in February
1899 (Kinzer 2006: 4950). In the United States, the Anti-Imperialist League
expressed its ‘full sympathy with the heroic struggles for liberty of the people in
the Spanish Islands (Friends’ Intelligencer Association 1898: 867.) In this view,
Aguinaldo was a Washington-like figure whose troops were willing to offer
their lives for the young republic. The League was not alone in opposing the
government’s policy. Professor Lewis Janes argued that:
our war in the Philippines was proof that, for the United States, ‘the
democratic spirit’ had succumbed to ‘commercial and moneymaking power’
. . . our imperial policy threatened not only the destruction of the Filipinos
but the vitality of popular democracy at home (cited in Welch 1979: 60, 63).
The decision to annex the Philippines should be understood in the context of its
time. The dominant values of the public and the national mood, which mirrored
the core social beliefs of the turn-of-the-century United States, were optimism
and romantic nationalism qua militarism. The public was optimistic in that it
believed in the legitimacy of the government’s foreign policy. The annexation
was ‘a people’s war into which our government was swept by public opinion’
(Halle 1985: 5).
Those who warned against the venture were denounced as pessimists, and
those who criticised the war were branded traitors ‘unworthy of the name of
American citizens’ (Welch 1979: 52). The public believed that the annexation
was glorious and inspirational, and was incredibly ‘war-hungry’ and imbued
with ‘war fever’ (Linderman 1987). Americans willingly tolerated the costs of
war, but their knowledge of it was chiefly limited to sensationalist reports from
newspapers like William Randolph Hearst’s New York Journal and Joseph
Pulitzer’s the World (Kinzer 2006: 106). Throughout the conflict, there was no
need for conscription; most of the troops were volunteers. The United States
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sustained more than 4000 fatalities in the Philippines, far outnumbering
those during the war in Cuba. The Philippines conflict cost the United States
about US$600 million, far greater than the Cuban war (Studenski and Krooss
1952: 235).
Nationalism and its associated values were so prevalent that the public,
spurred on by elites and sections of the media, enthusiastically embraced the
annexation. These popular values and the distinct contemporary mood were
more powerful than normative concerns in affecting the US public’s preferences
about war and peace. The joint democracy effect was an inadequate constraint
in the face of popular support for war.
Pressure for covert action in Chile
The United States had developed substantial economic interests in Chile by the
1960s, accounting for 90 percent of foreign investment in Chile at the end of
1968. In a briefing paper for the National Security Council in November 1970,
the CIA estimated the book value of US investment at US$800 million, of
which more than half was in mining and smelting. International Telephone &
Telegraph (ITT) was the largest investor, with a stake of more than US$200
million (Roberts 1973: 3). Against this backdrop, the government viewed the
popularity of Salvador Allende, a socialist and strident critic of US foreign
policy, as a challenge to its commercial interests. Firms such as ITT were hostile
to Allende and conveyed their concerns to the government.
A group of US businessmen in Chile offered to provide one and a half
million dollars to be . . . disbursed covertly by the US government.
[Eventually,] at least $350,000 was passed by ITT to this campaign. A
roughly equal amount was passed by other US companies (Church
Committee 1975: 16, 22).
Of even greater concern to US elites was the potential of Allende to emerge as
a threat to national security. Indeed, Henry Kissinger (1979: 656), National
Security Adviser to the Nixon administration, argued: ‘Nationalization of
American-owned property was not the issue’. By one account, Kissinger ‘never
gave a shit about the business community. What really underlay it was ideology’
(cited in Morris 1977: 241). US elites discussed the potential of Chile becoming
another Cuba*an exporter of communism and a challenge to the United States
in the western hemisphere (Kissinger 1979: 668; Nixon 1979: 607). Both
commercial and security interests prompted elites to pursue regime change in
Chile, but these interests were insufficient to generate popular consent for such
a policy.
The hostility of US elites stood in contrast to the reasonably positive view of
Allende that was evident in public opinion and the press. Chile was not a
Western democracy, but most US political scientists acknowledged it as the
60 Jaechun Kim and David Hundt
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [D
ea
kin
 U
niv
ers
ity
 L
ibr
ary
] a
t 1
5:1
0 1
9 J
an
ua
ry
 20
12
 
oldest and most stable democracy in Latin America. In 1970, over 80 percent of
Chileans participated in the election that resulted in Allende’s victory. Despite
concerted efforts by the CIA and domestic opponents to prevent his ascension to
power, the Parliament confirmed Allende as president in early November
(Kinzer 2006: 1824). Many Americans appeared to positively identify with
democracy in Chile, and had hopes for Allende on the grounds that his
administration was the product of free elections. ‘While maintaining those
liberties we cherish in our Bill of Rights’, wrote a US citizen, ‘I do believe [Chile]
is undergoing a noble struggle. We should hope for its success’ (New York
Times, 25 October 1970). The day after Chile’s election, the US government was
urged ‘to keep hands off, behave correctly and hope for the best. Dr Allende is a
Chilean, preferred by a plurality*though not a majority*of Chilean voters’
(New York Times, 6 September 1970; our emphasis). Soon after Allende was
sworn in as president, an editorial counselled against US intervention:
Dr. Allende . . . has reiterated his determination to build socialism only by
legal, constitutional means in democracy, pluralism and liberty. It is in
the best interests of this country to encourage him in every possible way
to remain on that course (New York Times, 7 January 1971; our
emphasis).
Against this backdrop, US elites found it difficult to convince the public that
toppling the elected government of Chile was compatible with US norms and
interests. ‘Military intervention to oust the Allende regime was never considered
here’, commented an editorial, ‘for practical as well as for political reasons’
(New York Times, 26 November 1970; our emphasis). The joint democracy
effect thus prevented the generation of popular consent for regime change in
Chile.
President Nixon publicly accepted the constraint imposed by joint democracy:
for the United States to have intervened, intervened in a free election and to
have turned it around, I think would have had repercussions all over Latin
America . . . as far as the United States was concerned that we recognized the
right of any country to have internal policies and an internal government
different from what we might approve of (cited in New York Times,
4 January 1971).
The public and media took Nixon’s words at face value. Most newspapers
welcomed the decision not to destabilise Chile. The New York Times (5 January
1971) opined: ‘Washington unreservedly recognizes the right of Chileans to
a Government of their own choosing; it will maintain correct relations with
the Marxist-led coalition of President Salvador Allende and will continue its
programs and contacts with the Chilean people’.
In addition to the joint democracy effect, a sceptical national mood
complicated efforts by elites to generate consent for the use of force in Chile.
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The Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal shaped the United States’ national
mood of the late 1960s and early 1970s. The public ‘accelerated its shift away
from support from the full range of Cold War policies’ (Levering 1978: 136,
121). The Vietnam War shook many Americans’ faith in political institutions in
general and elite leadership in particular. In addition, de´tente with the Soviet
Union and the Sino-Soviet split led to a reappraisal of the cold war consensus.
In the wake of the civil rights movement and Johnson’s war on poverty, many
stressed the need to reorder national priorities: according to a poll conducted in
the early 1970s, only 6 percent of respondents said that international issues
should be prioritised; 78 percent said that economic problems were paramount
(Melanson 2005: 17). The sceptical national mood was augmented by the
gradual intergenerational population replacement of older birth cohorts
(materialists) by younger cohorts (post-materialists), who had grown up during
an economically affluent, physically secure era (Inglehart 2000)*that is, the
emergence of a new generation of Americans, who remembered neither Munich
nor the World Wars, but instead recalled Dien Bien Phu, Khe Sahn and the
Cuban Missile Crisis, eroded the assumptions of the cold war era. The public
was less supportive of an activist foreign policy, making it difficult for US elites
to generate popular consent for an openly aggressive policy in Chile.
After Nixon announced that the United States would maintain normal
diplomatic relations with the Allende government, the New York Times
(26 November 1970) reported: ‘Politically, diplomats say, the impact of the
Nixon administration on Latin America appears to be negligible, with no visible
United States effort to counteract the adverse feelings resulting from the
Vietnam War and other controversial international situations’. Despite Nixon’s
statements, a world of difference lay between what he said to the US public and
the actions he took in Chile. His statements disguised policies which a majority
of Americans would have opposed. As Boorstein (1977: 5) notes: ‘Chile’s
worldwide reputation as a democratic country, the belief of its people in the
electoral process . . . led the US government to ‘‘a policy of low profile’’’. The
Church Committee (1975: 23) arrived at similar conclusions: covert action
‘deliberately served to negate openly avowed diplomatic policies of the US
government’. The US public was kept in the dark, but the CIA’s operations were
hardly covert to Chileans. Indeed, ‘covert involvement with economic and
military and ‘‘expert’’ support for opposition forces [developed] to a point
where the distinction between such activities and open war becomes fairly
academic’ (Sørenson 1992: 405).
Two paths to regime change
Security and economic interests were incentives for the United States to pursue
aggressive policies in the Philippines and Chile, but the targets had democratic
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credentials that were in part known to the US public. Consequently, there was
some opposition to the notion of toppling the target regimes.
Public sentiment became overwhelmingly pro-annexation in late 1898, but
quite a few Americans opposed regime change in the Philippines. For example,
the Anti-Imperialist League brought trade unions, farm organisations and other
groups into an anti-war coalition. Leading intellectuals and artists, including
Mark Twain, also opposed the decision to annex the islands. Twain denounced
McKinley’s justification of the annexation:
Dewey could have . . . left the competent Filipino citizens to set up the form
of government they might prefer and deal with the friars and their doubtful
acquisitions according to the Filipino idea of justice and fairness*ideas
which have been tested and found to be of as high an order as any that
prevail in Europe or America (cited in Kang 2007: 183).
The Senate almost blocked the ratification of the Treaty of Paris, which
formalised the ceding of the Philippines from Spain to the United States. Other
opponents included the East Coast press, liberals and some black journalists.
After deciding to invade the Philippines, McKinley attacked his opponents
and sought to rally popular support. He invoked nationalistic, patriotic and
moralistic public sentiments. The oratory was often demagogic:
it is the duty of the army of the occupation to announce and to proclaim . . .
that we have come, not as invaders or conquerors, but as friends to protect
the natives in their homes, in their business, and in their personal or religious
liberty (cited in Miller 1982: 25).
Such moral appeals resonated with a US public enthralled by nationalism.
Portraying another state as an enemy or evil force has long been essential to
generating popular consent for war. Invoking a negative image of Filipinos was
critical to McKinley’s campaign to garner support for his policy. In a letter to a
newspaper, he wrote: ‘What do we really know about Aguinaldo? . . . He comes
of a mixed race . . . a race that never had the opportunity, by experience in
public affairs, to develop the capacity for self-government’ (New York Times,
23 January 1899).
McKinley argued that Filipinos needed tutelage, and explained his decision to
annex the archipelago in the following manner: ‘One night it came to me . . .
that there was nothing to do but take them all, and to educate the Filipinos, and
uplift and civilize and Christianize them as our fellowmen’ (cited in Kang 2007:
183). The expansionist elites manipulated the slogan of ‘moral obligation’,
using the term to give their actions broad appeal. Theodore Roosevelt was an
even more fervent advocate of the social Darwinian notion of racial fitness.
During the 1900 presidential campaign, Roosevelt publicly denounced Filipinos
as savages and as being as irrational as the Apaches. His resort to racial
superiority proved effective, appealing to the racism widespread among white
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Americans. Elihu Root, the Secretary of the War Department, stated: ‘there was
‘‘no Philippine people’’ . . . the alleged government of Aguinaldo at Malolos was
never acknowledged by a majority of the Filipinos’ and it ‘was marked by the
worst evils of semi-civilized misgovernment’. Accordingly, some US troops
harboured deep racial hatred towards Filipinos. A soldier wrote in a letter to his
family: ‘The country won’t be pacified until the niggers are killed off like the
Indians’ (cited in Miller 1982: 179). Nonetheless, some officials based in the
archipelago still believed Filipinos to be capable of self-government. After a
survey of the condition of the islands was completed, McKinley was urged to
‘adjust sovereignty and responsibility with the reasonable aspirations of the
Filipinos’, who would be allowed to ‘govern and garrison mainly through
themselves’ (Philippine Commission 1901: 4).
Whereas McKinley invaded the Philippines, the Nixon administration
resorted to covert action in Chile. The political repercussions of open war
weighed heavily on the administration. By going underground, US elites skirted
the constraints of public opinion. As Merom (1990: 79) notes: ‘The Nixon
administration was quick to realize that if the destabilization of Chile was
executed properly the American public would be ignorant of it’. The New York
Times (15 September 1974) noted: ‘the United States had two possible roads to
travel: one of correct diplomatic relations*perhaps even favored treatment,
since Chile was one of the few remaining representative governments in the
region*or political chicanery’. The road that Nixon travelled was the latter,
disguised as the former.
Regardless of domestic objections, Nixon was determined to oust Allende.
Most Americans were unaware that their government was plotting to over-
throw the Chilean leader. The contradictory elements of openly declared and
real, secret policies were never explained, even within the administration. The
Chief of Naval Operations, Elmo Zumwalt (1976: 323), complained: ‘No one
in Defense . . . knew precisely what administration policy toward Chile was
because Henry [Kissinger] had made an elaborate point of not telling them’.
Nixon and Kissinger believed that Allende threatened US interests, but the
public was not equally convinced. On assuming office in 1974, President Gerald
Ford took great pains to convince the public that the intervention in Chile
served US interests. As the New York Times (23 September 1974) pointed out in
its editorial, however: ‘people are increasingly puzzled at Ford’s remark, and
why [covert operations in Chile] are in the best interest of Americans’. After the
overthrow of Allende, the New York Times (12 September 1973) commented:
‘It is especially tragic for Chile, where sturdy democratic machinery had
functioned for many years . . . it is essential that Washington meticulously keep
hands off the present crisis, which only Chileans can resolve’ (our emphasis).
But, within months, the role of the United States in ousting Allende was
revealed to the public. The Washington Post mused on 16 September 1974
whether the United States had a legal or moral right, let alone the authority, to
undertake covert war against the government of a sovereign state. ‘Putting aside
64 Jaechun Kim and David Hundt
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [D
ea
kin
 U
niv
ers
ity
 L
ibr
ary
] a
t 1
5:1
0 1
9 J
an
ua
ry
 20
12
 
all concern about American values and international properties’, the New York
Times (23 September 1974) remarked, ‘the intervention in Chile was plainly a
mistake’. Further, columnist Anthony Lewis noted: ‘[Kissinger’s] aim was
to remove the constraint of . . . America’s ‘‘natural and healthy taste for open
debate’’’ (New York Times, 26 September 1974).
On the revelation of covert action in Chile, a series of efforts ensued in order
to conceal the United States’ role in the coup. Edward Korry, former
Ambassador to Chile, stated: ‘The United States did not seek to pressure,
subvert, influence a single member of the Chilean Congress at any time in the
entire four years of my stay’ (cited in New York Times, 16 September 1974).
Speaking to a Senate committee, Charles Meyer, a former Assistant Secretary of
State for Inter-American Affairs, said: ‘We bought no votes, we funded no
candidates, we promoted no coups’ (cited in New York Times, 5 April 1973).
Jack Kubisch, also a former Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American
Affairs, told the Senate: ‘It is untrue to say that the US Government was
responsible either directly or indirectly for the overthrow of the Allende regime’
(cited in New York Times, 15 November 1973). Finally, Kissinger testified:
‘The CIA had nothing to do with the coup, to the best of my knowledge and
belief’ (cited in New York Times, 8 September 1974).
When it was no longer feasible to conceal their involvement in Chile, US
elites attempted to depict Allende as an evil figure. In his memoirs, Kissinger
(1999: 750) portrayed Allende as a revolutionary tyrant ready to abandon
Chilean democracy. Other officials similarly claimed that US policy was
designed to prevent a revolutionary dictator from undermining democracy.
They made these claims only after the covert action was exposed. Critics of the
government responded by claiming that the CIA’s actions were antithetical to
US ideals. Congressman Michael Harrington argued that the government was
‘unsuccessfully trying to sell the story that the United States acted only to save
the principles of democracy being dismantled by Allende’ (New York Times,
25 September 1974; our emphasis), rather than admitting that the aim of the
covert action was to destabilise Chile. Despite having ‘his unsavory qualities’,
argued a critic of Allende, ‘his actions remained within constitutional bounds’
(Carpenter 1985: 48).
Conclusions
This article has explored how the joint democracy effect, popular values and
distinct contemporary mood influenced the consent-generating efforts of US
elites in two different time periods. The behaviour of elites in both cases was
inconsistent with the predictions of the democratic peace thesis. Instead, we
argue, the popular mood and values largely determined the public’s initial
preference regarding war and peace. A relatively weaker joint democracy effect
facilitated efforts by US elites to generate popular consent for regime change in
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the Philippines, but a relatively stronger joint democracy effect impeded such
efforts in Chile. Figure 4 summarises our main findings.
Some conclusions can be drawn from the cases. First, elites used the alleged
lack of democracy in the Philippines and Chile to depict the targets as morally
inferior to the United States. Elites also demonised the leaders of these states:
they justified covert action by portraying Allende negatively on an ex post and
ad hoc basis, and they depicted Aguinaldo as an enemy of the United States
before and during the Philippines conflict. For US elites, these states were simply
not democratic in the same sense as the United States*and were therefore
ineligible for the privileges that accompany such a categorisation, like freedom
from invasion and destabilisation.
Second, the public mood influenced the efforts of US elites to rally support for
their campaigns of regime change. During a period of colonial expansion and
the prevalent belief in social Darwinism, some Americans viewed Filipinos as an
innately inferior race. The generation of popular consent to war and occupation
was much simpler for elites, who claimed that US tutelage was necessary for
Filipinos to develop democratic self-government. In contrast, it would have
been difficult to generate consent for an invasion based on such racist notions
after the civil rights movement of the 1960s. Given that Chile was Latin
America’s oldest and most stable democracy, elites could not convince the
public that toppling Allende would benefit either Chilean democracy or US
interests. A survey conducted in 1975 found that ‘60 percent of the US public
PUBLIC ELITES POLICY
CHILE 
PHILIPPINES
- ‘Introvert’ and Sceptical National Mood
- Post-Vietnam Syndrome  
Difficult to
Generate
Consent   
Covert
Action  
Moderate–Weak
Joint Democracy
Effect   
- Romantic Nationalism and Imperialism
- Racism and Social Darwinism  
Easy to
Generate
Consent   
Open
War  
Moderate–Strong
Joint Democracy
Effect   
Figure 4. Two Paths to Regime Change.
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believed that Chileans had lived better under Allende’s government’ (Mares
2001: 13) than under the coup leader and future president Augusto Pinochet.
Third, a path to regime change typified by covert action rather than open
warfare implies a lower degree of cohesion within the policy-making elite.
McKinley mobilised the machinery of government and the press to the cause
of annexation in the Philippines, but some elites in the State Department
opposed the intervention in Chile on philosophical grounds. It seems that one of
the reasons why the elites undertook covert operations was to circumvent
normative restraints. This finding provides a corrective to the assumption of
inter-regime cohesion presented by the democratic peace thesis. The core
decision-making elites*Nixon and his coterie, who approved and ordered
covert action in Chile*did not share the normative concerns of the partici-
pating elites*the numerous lower-ranking officials who subsequently ex-
pressed dismay at the campaign to destabilise Allende. Furthermore, elites did
not exhibit a preference for settling disputes with Chile, a fellow democracy, via
peaceful means. This finding undermines the democratic peace theory, the
explanatory logic of which assumes that the leaders of democracies prefer to
resolve conflicts peacefully.
Finally, the nature of international order is a crucial contextual variable that
predetermines the capacity of joint democracy to operate as a pacifying effect.
Democracy carries overwhelming advantages, including a close correlation with
prosperity. A world populated with stable and mature democracies would
undoubtedly be a much safer and more prosperous place in which to live,
but the pacifying effects of joint democracy may be diminished in a poorly
structured international system. Our case studies demonstrate that variables at
the international level (imperialism and the cold war order) can adversely affect
domestic-level variables (such as joint democracy) by aggravating public
opinion.
Notes
1. An elite is an open and permeable body of people who shape public affairs (McClosky and
Zaller 1984: 13), and can be differentiated by the intensity of their impact on policy decisions.
Chief among these are core decisional elites or decision-making elites such as presidents and
advisers. Somewhat less involved are participating elites, who play limited roles in formulating
and executing policy. They are mostly middle- to low-ranking officials. Much less involved is a
relatively large group of attentive elites: members of Congress, the media and opinion leaders.
2. The Vietnam War and the Second Gulf War illustrate that conflicts with non-democracies
may also be divisive and unpopular. Even during periods of extroverted public mood, the
United States occasionally has committed military troops abroad. For example, the Reagan
administration sent the Marines to the small island of Grenada in the name of restoring
democracy and protecting US citizens in October 1983. The intervention was presented to the
public as a fait accompli, and most Americans approved of Reagan’s decision to apply a
military solution to Grenada. This intervention could also be justified in the name of restoring
democracy and protecting US medical students in Grenada; hence its categorisation in Figure 3
as exhibiting a weak joint democracy effect.
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